Risk absorption in Japanese subcontracting : a microeconometirc study on the automobile industry by Asanuma, Banri & Kikutani, Tatsuya
TitleRisk absorption in Japanese subcontracting : amicroeconometirc study on the automobile industry
Author(s)A anuma, Banri; Kikutani, Tatsuya

























               Tatsuya Kikutani 
                             Faculty of Economics, 







WORKING PAPER NO. 14
   RISK ABSORPTION IN JAPANESE SUBCONTRACTING: 
A MICROECONOMETRIC STUDY ON THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
                   by 
               Banri Asanuma 
            and 
                Tatsuya Kikutani
May 1991
Faculty of Economics 
Kyoto University 
Kyoto, 606 JAPAN
    Risk Absorption in Japanese Subcontracting: 
A Microeconometric Study on the Automobile Industry*
Faculty
                 by 
                 Banri Asanuma 
 Faculty of Economics, Kyoto University, Kyoto 606, Japan 
                AND 
                Tatsuya Kikutani 
of Business Administration, Kyoto Sangyo University, Kyoto 603, Japan
Revised 
May 1991
Forthcoming in: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
ABSTRACT
  Prevalence of subcontracting in Japan has traditionally been ascribed to risk shifting 
behavior of manufacturers. But, Asanuma's field research has elicited the following. First, 
in transactions with those suppliers with which it maintains longstanding relations, each 
typical manufacturer absorbs risks to a nonnegligible degree. Second, the degree tends to be 
higher (1) the larger the share occupied by the manufacturer in the total sales of the supplier; 
and (2) the more rudimentary the category of the item transacted viewed from evolutionary 
paths of suppliers. We adapt he principal-agent model derived by Kawasaki and McMillan 
based on a fundamental result acquired by Holmstrom and Milgrom on linearity of the 
optimal conpensation scheme, construct aset of data on individual suppliers to each of four 
major automobile manufacturers, and quantitatively verify the above propositions. 
  Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, L14, L23, L62, Mll.
1. Introduction
The Risk Shifting Hypothesis 
   It has been been widely perceived that major Japanese manufacturing firms tend to use 
subcontracting to a larger extent. =than their counterparts in other industrialized countries. In 
other words, large firms in Japan_ have been noticed to procure arelatively greater portion of 
the. parts and processing services .necessary tomanufacture their final products from outside 
firms, relying less on in-house plants!) Since information on the outside purchasing ratio is 
currently hard to obtain systematically, it is difficult to examine validity of this perception 
rigourously for each individual product. But, fragmental pieces of evidence do suggest that 
the characterization is roughly correct, at least in U.S.-Japan comparisons.2) 
  Until fairly recently,. researchers and policy makers tended to regard the perceived tendency 
as a resultant of late development of Japan and as a weak point of her economy. As the 
1970s evolved into the 1980s, however, this evaluation began to be reversed. The same 
tendency has come to be thought consonant with contemporary technologies and tastes, and 
adding quick adaptability o Japanese manufacturing industries. 
   But, what are the. incentives for major Japanese manufacturers that have made them use 
outside suppliers. to. such an extent? Concerning this, question, there has been a conventional 
view. The view has its origin in. -the pre-war .views -on the. Japanese. subcontracting system 
held by Japanese social scientists, and. has been diffused worldwide since the 1950s with the 
literature that spotlights the. "dual structure" of the Japanese conomy. 4)
   This conventional view. emphasizes the following .as the major factor: exploiting -their 
monopsonistic position, large manufacturers can utilize their outside suppliers as a :buffer, 
against business fluctuations. More precisely, the assertion is as follows. During business 
upswings, buying a relatively higher proportion of parts from outside, large manufacturers 
save investments- in fixed assets. When demand for the final, products lackens., they.;:quickly 
withdraw the supply contracts from outside firms. Thus, large. firms can enjoy relatively-stable;;. 
utilization rate . of their capacities and work forces, and hence, less, fluctuation *of their 
operating. profit,. at -the expense of their subcontractors. In short, the conventional view has 
characterized. subcontracting mainly as a. device through which Jarge manufacturers can shift 
the risk involved in their business income onto their: subcontractors. Let us. therefore, name,: 
this view the.Risk. Shifting , Hypothesis (RSH, hereafter). 
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Emergence of Another Strand of View 
   While RSH became an integral part of a widely held picture of the Japanese conomy, 
a different view came to be voiced as Japan experienced years of high economic growth. 
Based on a questionnaire survey and field research conducted in Kansai area, Tasugi (1961) 
has noted that, in the machinery industry, core firms have come to take a long run view in 
their use of subcontractors; at least for major core firms, development of the skills of their 
subcontractors bymaintaining. ongoing relationship and providing technological guidance has 
become their major concern, so that utilization as a capacity buffer does not constitute their 
primary motive any more 5 Tasugi's observation went unnoticed or neglected by most of his 
contemporary scholars. A similar view has been asserted by Kiyonari (1970) based on his 
research on the small and medium sized firms in Japan during the latter half of the 1960s. 
This again remained the minority opinion and had to await he 1980s to get appreciation from 
wider audience including some of those who had once been in the opponents' camp. 6) 
   Reflections on the measures taken by large firms in Japan for adjustment during the years 
that ensued the first oil shock, and a survey released by MITI on subcontracting , led Aoki 
(1984) to a view which can be regarded as a developed version of the view taken by Tasugi 
in 1961 and by Kiyonari in 1970. Aoki's distinct contribution is that he has connected the 
issue with the economic theory of risk bearing. He has interpreted the observed behavior of 
Japanese firms in the hard time as risk sharing between large firms and their subcontractors. 
Further, he has noted that large core firms may possibly be absorbing relatively more risk 
and . performing an. insurance function in exchange for premiums payable in the form of 
monopolistic (and/or monopsonic) gains. 7)
The Risk Absorption Hypothesis 
   Based on field research, Asanuma (1984a,1984b) has given a systematic description of 
the contractual practices developed in the Japanese automobile industry regarding parts 
transaction. This work has shown, among others, the following: such a set of practices that 
works, viewed as a whole, as had been expected by Aoki in fact exists and is prevalent. 
Asanuma (1989) has complemented this work based on additional field research on the 
Japanese automobile and electric machinery industries. From what have been reported in 
these articles, we extract below three points which seem to have crucial importance in
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assessing validity of RSH. Since RSH is concerned primarily With "subcontractors" in the 
sense of suppliers of "Ordered Goods," or customized parts or processing services, as opposed 
to" Marketed Goods" type parts, we hereafter focus on suppliers that fall under this category.8)
  (Al). It is certainly true that, frequently, the first tier suppliers to a given core firm 
include such firms that can receive orders from this core firm only intermittently, being used 
by this core firm as a capacity buffer. But, this kind of firms comprise only a subset of the 
entire' body of the first tier suppliers'.: Moreover, the subset occupies only the peripheral 
portion of the entire set, since it consists of marginal suppliers viewed from the ranking 
system which this core firm applies to its suppliers. The nucleus portion of - the same set 
consists of suppliers ranked higher. For later reference, we name members of this portion 
"satellites. "9) The core firm typically seeks to develop close and -longstanding relations with 
each "satellite," placing orders as continuously as possible. 
   (A2). If we focus on the relations between a given core firm and its "satellites," 
contractual practices observable therein typically contain mechanisms through which the core 
firm absorbs risks involved in the transaction toa nonnegligible degree.
  (A3). Concerning this risk absorption, the following two tendencies are observable. (1) 
The more concentrated the business of this supplier to the supply to this particular core firm, 
the more risk this core firm will be willing to absorb. (2) The more rudimentary, from an 
evolutionary viewpoint, he "present position of the supplier in terms of the nature of the item 
being supplied, the more risk the core firm will be willing, to absorb.
  Two remarks are in order here. First, (Al) implies the following. RSH fails to capture the 
fact that the core firm "treats its suppliers differently depending on the rank it has given each 
supplier, arguing as if the situation which is actually observable only for marginal suppliers 
were applicable to "satellites" as well. It makes an oversimplification in this regard. Second, 
both (A2) and (A3) imply that, for "satellites," RSH gives wrong predictions. Note especially 
the following. Upon the condition in (1) or (2) in (A3), RSH would predict hat the core firm 
will treat the subcontractor in question. all the more relentlessly as its buffer, since both 
conditions imply that the purchaser's position is ' enhanced toward monopsonicity. But (A3) 
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gives an exactly opposite prediction. 
  In sum, taken -as a bundle, (A2) and (A3) provides a counter hypothesis to RSH. We 
therefore combine (A2) and (A3) together and name it the Risk Absorption Hypothesis (RAH, 
hereafter).
Toward Quantitative Establishment of RAH 
   The purpose of this paper is to present he results. of our ;research ;aimed at giving a 
quantitative t st to RAH. Looking ;from the aim of this work, a seminal step has been taken 
by Kawasaki and.McMillan (1987). Stimulated by the findings. reported .by Asanuma, they, 
derived a principal-agent model based on a fundamental result acquired by Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1987) which. guarantees that, in a fairly broad range of situations, , the :optimal 
scheme for a principal to. compensate, hisor .her agent can be given by a linear function - of 
end-of-period results. They then estimated the parameters from Japanese industrial data, and 
tested a hypothesis very close to our RAH. According to their own summary, their work has 
shown the following. First, the subcontractors: arerisk averse. Second,., the contracts have the 
principal absorbing some of the risk on behalf of the :subcontractors. Third, the price-adjusts. 
more to changes in the subcontractor's, production costs ,(1) the more: risk averse the 
subcontractor; (2) the bigger the fluctuation i  costs; and (3) the less severe the moral hazard. 
   Our. work extends this accomplishment by Kawasaki- and McMillan in the, following way. 
Regarding the; model,- we basically.: follow them.,=More specifically, =we adopt estimation 
equations that -have the same basic structure as those used -by them. To; the interface between 
the model and computational work, however,: we introduce following-two_ inventions. The first 
is that, mobilizing three -data sources:. the-, combined use. of which in academic , research is i 
attempted here fore the first time, we construct a data set which enables to conduct analysis 
at -a more- micro: level. Kawasaki and McMillan .had to rely on- two:'data; s urces compiled and 
published lay-MiTI. T'hesesources though dependable, only provide..~classifiedaggregate data.-
This imposes following two constraints on : analyzers; , -which . is. frustrating: for the type,. ;of 
analysis we aim at., One of, the constraints, i  that :the data .do not p rn it` discriminating the 
"satellites" to large manufacturing .firms; =from .other :firms. subsumed, : in:' the. same .:.class. 
Another s i that the data do. not allow regrouping of :suppliers by- their.-C'irms. lour; data 
set, enables urpassing these: constraints... 1 The second, of_~-our inventions-,, J '' at we contrive 
new proxies which enables. the test :of RAH asi repwsent'ed;-b r(A2) and= (A3); for ,this .fob.
reflects practices of Japanese core-, firms more directly, and perhaps a little more fully, than 
the version used by Kawasaki: and McMillan. 
   Our main results are twofold. First, for each of the four major automobile manufacturers 
in. Japan, Toyota, Nissan, Mazda,. and Mitsubishi Motor Corporation (MMC, hereafter), as 
much as 90 percent of unpredicted cost overrun or underrun i curred by its satellites i shown 
to have been absorbed in the course of their. transaction. Second, again for each of the core 
firms named above, both (1) and (2) in . (A3) is confirmed. Though there are substantial 
differences among these core firms in ' their respective historical paths for development and 
current shares in the automobile market, our analysis illuminates that.these firms have taken 
surprisingly similar attitudes toward their respective suppliers. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the model used for 
estimation. Section 3 expounds the data set we constructed. Section 4 explains the proxies 
we contrived. Section 5 presents the results, of estimations and -interpretes them. Section 6. 
concludes the paper. 
                           2. The' Model
  '-In this section we give a brief account of the model used for our estimation. This is 
repetitive of Kawasaki and McMillan, but is included here to make the paper self-contained. 
For further details, the readers are referred to their article. 
   In this model, the principal corresponds to~ a core. firm and the agent o a -subcontractor. 
The core firm is assumed to behave .as, i f it:"is risk neutral toward.a particularr contract, ..while,.,. 
the subcontractor is -assumed tobehave toward the same.contract reflecting autility function . 
with constant ' absolute risk aversion: 
   The subcontractor's production activities take place,, throughout a period, but 'the core: firm 
pays the. ;subcontractor nly -,.,at- - he send 'of the.-period.-,, The-.:payment p is based on 
accumulated production •-cost c.. This cost fluctuates randomly., but.. the subcontractor --can, with 
costly effort, achieve cost reduction. 
   The core firm's optimal payment function is 'represented by
p=..b.+:a(c-11 )  0)
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where p is the price paid, b is the target price set in advance by the core firm, and a is the 
sharing parameter chosen ex ante by the core firm. If a = 0, the contract is fixed price; all 
of the risk of cost fluctuations is borne by the subcontractor. If a = 1, the contract is cost 
plus; the core firm bears the entire risk. If 0 < a < 1, the risk is shared. The quantity ordered 
from the subcontractor for the period concerned is taken to be exogenous and, by appropriate 
choice of units, is normalized to one. Thus the price p can be regarded asequivalent to the 
sales from the subcontractor t  the core firm for the entire period. 
   The realized production cost c is supposed to be decomposable into three components:
c=c`+W-~ (2)
where c` represents he ex ante expected cost including normal profit margin; w is a random 
variable representing unpredictable cost fluctuations observed only by the subcontractor in the 
course of doing the work; ~ denotes the reduction in cost due to the subcontractor's effort. 
The effort can be measured in monetary terms as h(), is financed from the gross profit of 
the subcontractor, and exhibits the following kind of diminishing returns property:
h(() = I2/ 28 (3)
for some 8 > 0. 
  The value of c` is known to both party. While the core firm cannot observe the realization 
of w, it does know its distribution, which is assumed to be normal with mean zero and 
variance a2.~ The core firm also cannot directly observe the level of the cost reducing effort 
by the subcontractor and, because the core firm cannot observe the realization of w, it cannot 
deduce the subcontractor's effort from its observation of the total cost c. Thus there is 
asymmetry of information between the parties, and hence the problem of moral hazard. 
  Maximizing expected utility of profit, the subcontractor will choose a level of effort:
~=8(1 - a). (4)
Denote the variance of the subcontractor's profits by s2. Then, we have:
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                   s2 (1 a)2 02: (5) 
  If the value of the sharing parameter, a, is set high, then, alarge proportion f the effect 
of possible cost overruns beyond the control of the- subcontractor willbe shifted to the core 
firm, and a large proportion ofwindfall gains from cost underruns has to be yielded to the 
core firm, both through ex post price adjustments. This is the insurance effect of the contract 
formula of price revision expressed by (1). But, when a. is set high, the cost reduction 
achieved by the subcontractor's innovation effort has also shared by the core firm to a great 
extent. This consideration may attenuate the subcontractor's innovation effort. This is the 
incentive (or moral hazard) effect hat he same formula bears.lo> 
 Anticipating that the subcontractor will respond to any choice of the value of a by 
choosing his cost reducing effort h() so that (4) is satisfied, the core firm will choose the 
value of a so as to satisfy: 
                    a=Xo2i(8+Xa), (6) 
where )c is the Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute risk aversion, and 8 is a measure of 
effectiveness of the cost reducing effort, which is also interpreted as a measure of moral 
hazard. 
   Taking logarithms of both sides of (6) and rearranging, we have: 
                   In (1/a-1)=ln(1/o2)+ln(1/X)+In8. (7) 
This is the basic equation used by Kawasaki and McMillan for their regressions. We follow 
them in adopting this equation as the basis for our empirical analysis. 
                           3. The Data Set 
   We have mentioned in Section 1 that he data sources used by Kawasaki and McMillan 
impose two constraints on analyzers. In addition to these two, the sources actually involve 
one more constraint. Of the two data sources used by them, Census of Manufactures (The 
Firm Series), and Surveys of Industries, it is the latter that provides data more or less related 
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to subcontracting. But, for those data items that are especially important for the analysis of 
subcontracting, Surveys of Industries limits its samples to the firms with less than 300 
employees. This practice may be traced back to the legal definition of "subcontracting small 
and medium sized firms" adopted in the Law on the Promotion of Subcontracting. Small and 
Medium Sized Firms enacted in 1970, and can be justified for the purpose of this law. When 
one's purpose is to conduct analysis on the suppliers that surround agiven core firm, however, 
there is : no reason to confine attention to the firms with less than 300 emplyees, since 
subcontractors per se do not necessarily fallunder thee small and medium sized firm category. 
To assess validity of RSH, it becomes particularly important to examine how risk shifting (or 
absorbing) behavior of the core firm,, toward relatively developed suppliers. differs. from that 
shown to less developed supplier. To surpass the three constraints including this last :imposed 
by ,the. official statistics. used by, Kawasaki. and ' McMillan, we constructed our, data set 
mobilizing following three data sources.
Cosmos 1Data File 
   For each of the firms in Japan whose stocks are either listed at the stock exchanges or 
registered for over-the-counter. trading, •Yuka Shoken Hokokusho S ran.(The Financial Report 
of. the Companies filed. to the .Ministry . of Finance - in compliance with -the -Law on Securities 
Transaction) published by the Ministry of Finance, the American counterpart of which is .the 
10-K Report, provides fairly,-detailed - nformation.. Unfortunately, there are a large number 
of suppliers whose stocks are neither listed nor registered. Some of them are not even a joint-
stock corporation. -Yuka Shoken, Hokokusho S ran is not suited therefore tothe analysis of 
subcontracting. This must be the basic reason why Kawasaki and McMillan were compelled 
to'-turn`to'.the aggregate, data. 
   But, there xists a data : source that:. furnishes . micro financial . data akin, to . the items in, 
Yuka Shoken Hokokusho S ran even for those companies which do not have to report to the 
Ministry of Finance. This is Cosmos T D- ata : le ,compiled byTeikoku Data Bank, a credit 
information service company, as the basis for its information service. Since collection of 
individual `.firm data for' this file. depends solely on cooperatiwe.;_ ttito4e..-Of-,tb, firms,._ some 
companies : refuse to supply: data -when whey, come to feel,: unhappy with their performar e_, at 
the- end of a particular, period;.: some,-.other. firms do not want o 4i close. _t i tr ,.data from the 
beginning: For thisf reason, coverage : of firms is} nit lob ;percent -and, time .series data. of the'.
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firms. in this file are at times incomplete. Still, the feature noted at the outset of this 
paragraph suggests hat development of academic use of this data source is worth attempting. 
As will be seen shortly, the source does provide a considerably good coverage of the 
"satellite" type suppliers to major Japanese automobile manufacturers. 
Member Lists of Cooperative Associations 
   As has been mentioned in Asanuma (1989), the "satellite" type suppliers to a given core 
firm -in the Japanese automobile industry typically organize. themselves into Kyoryokukai 
(Cooperative Association). Member lists of these i associations are available " ither from 
reports of industrial research companies like IRC or IRS published mainly for business- use, 
or from annual editions of Nippon no Jidosha Buhin Kogyo (The Automobile Parts Industry 
in Japan) edited by Nippon Jidosha Buhin Kogyokai (The Japanese Association of Parts 
Manufacturers) jointly with Auto Trade Journal, Inc. 
   Reflecting individual historical : situations, atellites -of, a given core firm have organized 
themselves ` along various principles. For instance,'' the "satellite" type parts suppliers. to 
Toyota type have formed three associations amed Tok`ai Kyohokai, Kanto Kyohokai,- and 
Kansai Kyohokai on regional' basis.: Some suppliers that have their offices and/or plants in two 
different regions. may possibly :be joining two of the three regional associations ata time.-On 
` the other hand; the "satellite" type' parts .suppliers toNissan have formed two associations • 
named Takarakai nd Shohokai. The former consists of subsidiaries and related companies" 
of Nissan in addition to the 'suppliers-that have 'been'relatively more dependentoni Nissan;' the: 
latter is' constituted 'byother firms which ave been 'relatively more independent -but `'still kept 
close and longstanding relations with Nissan.") Thus there is not necessarily one `single 
association corresponding `'toeach' core 'firm. This 'makes deterri ination of the number of 
"satellites" a little troublesome. 
 F: As of 1987,-"the' number of the "satellite" type parts uppliers t6each of major automobile 
manufacturers that we were able to determine from member lists of cooperative associations 
is: 181 for Toyota, 166 for Nissan, 188 for Mazda, and 329 for MMC. 
Micro Data in 'Industiia'F-Aesedich Re ports 
 For each of the "satellite" type suppliers thus!'-deter-mined we investigated ava%labilit df
its 'balance sheets= and profit ~and'pl6ss `sstater ents from' Cosnio: 1Da?a-' File for fl consecutive
fiscal years from 1977 to 1987. These time series data are required to compute the value of 
a for each company using Equation (5). 
   To conduct regressions, we need another kind of micro data in addition to the financial 
data of the sort explained above. They are required to determine the values of three variables 
which will be explained later: SPEC, IMP1, and IMP2. The reports made by and published 
from IRC, one of the industrial research firms mentioned before, contain for some suppliers 
sufficient information to enable this determination, but not for others. 
   The number of the "satellite" type parts suppliers for which both kinds of micro data are 
available is: 96 for Toyota, 75 for Nissan, 87 for Mazda, and 97 for MMC. These suppliers 
comprise our sample.12)
4. The Proxies
   In carrying out regression analysis, Kawasaki and McMillan have derived two variants 
of the equation (7), named Model I and Model II respectively, and obtained estimates for each 
of the two. In dealing with Model II, they first got estimates ofa, separately, and then, using 
these values, estimated the coefficient of In (1/A); one of the independent variables in (7). For 
8, on the other hand, they used a pair of proxies instead of trying to get its estimates directly. 
In dealing with Model I, they used proxies for both a, and 8. In this section, focusing on their 
Model I, we describe what kind of proxies we have introduced instead of those used by 
Kawasaki and McMillan, and explain why. How we estimated our values of A. and conducted 
regressions for an equation which corresponds to their Model II will. be explained-later in 
Section 5. 
  The basic form of their Model I is given by the following equation. 
             In (1/ a -.1) = ao + alln(1/a2) + ax, + ax, + ax, + ax, + E. (8)
   Here x2 and x3 are proxies for the inverse of the degree of risk aversion, and x4 and x5 are 
ptoxies for the extent of moral hazard. All of the coefficients a; are predicted to take strictly 
positive values, except ao, which is predicted to be zero. 
   We take up the proxies for moral-hazard. first,, and- then- proceed to those for risk aversion.
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Proxies for Moral Hazard 
  Table III in Kawasaki and McMillan (1987) shows that he estimated coefficient ofx5 
gives the wrong sign, and is statistically insignificant. This indicates that he choice of the 
variable may have been inappropriate. Kawasaki and McMillan used the wage/material costs 
ratio as x5, citing a couple of findings reported by Asanuma as the basis for this choice. But, 
as has been discussed in detail n Asanuma and Kikutani (1990), the Asanuma's report in fact 
does not necessarily lead to this choice; nor does the variable seem to suit their intention very 
well. On the other hand, their choice of x4, the- proportion of inputs secured by the 
subcontractor himself, has produced far better results. But, here, we come across the 
following problem. Dependence of materials procurement on the core firms is a phenomenon 
typical to smaller subcontractors engaged primarily in processing services, and quickly 
disappears as suppliers grow. Since we want to encompass in the analysis the whole body of 
"satellites
," including firms with more than 299 employees and with own proprietary 
technology, we need a proxy that can reflect relative capabilities of suppliers over a more 
extended continuum. 
   Our contrivance here is as follows. Based on the observed tendency given by (2) of (A3) 
in Section 1, we introduce just one variable, instead of two, as our proxy for the moral 
hazard/incentive effect. This variable measures the degree of evolution achieved to date by 
the supplier concerned. The current position of any supplier in the whole conceivable 
evolutionary loci is, in turn, determined by the properties of the main product offered by this 
supplier to its customers. 
   We use a three dimensional space, the basic idea of which has been laid out by Asanuma 
(1989), to plot the position of each supplier determined bythe method escribed above. The 
first coordinate axis of this space coincides with the horizontal xis of TABLE 2 in Asanuma 
(1989), which measures the degree of technological initiative that a supplier can exert vis-a-
vis a given core firm in the development a d manufacturing stages of its main product. 
Seven subcategories of parts are discriminated along this axis. The first three subcategories 
comprise , the DS(Drawings Supplied) parts category, the next three constitutes the 
DA(Drawings Approved) parts category, the last corresponding to the "Marketed Goods" type 
parts category. As has been stated in Propositions 4 and 6 in Asanuma (1989), the more 
rightward we go along this axis, the more the processes of development a d manufacturing 
become black-box seen from the core firm, and, other things being equal, the profit margin
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can increase. 
   The direction of development. that a supplier- seeks in -its pursuit of growth is not limited 
to the-rightward movement along the first :axis, however. For some "Marketed Goods type 
parts, the number, of suppliers may be large, making any of them easily substitutable. On the 
other hand, when a supplier -gets a contract to supply transmissions -toa core firm based on 
the drawings upplied from this core firm, this supplier, cannot be switched so- easily in 
comparison to' the. suppliers of simpler DS parts, even if both this, transmission -and the 
simpler parts concerned fall under the same subcategory II regarding the first axis. Further, 
as it becomes more difficult for a given core. firm to :'find alternative- sources of supply of ~a 
given item, it becomes harder for the same core firm to =keep the'. margin -of this item 
low utilizing competition amongg the potential suppliers:. - Taking these into consideration,. we
introduce asecond axis which measures the degree of difficulty faced. by a given core firm 
to find' alternative sources of supply for a given part in question. The more northward we 
go along this axis, the situation approaches that of monopoly. 
   The third axis measures the share of the part in question in the total amount of relational 
quasi-rent. attributable to the. final: product manufactured -by: the core firm concerned... The 
amount of relational quasi-rent is approximated bythe value added in the empirical work to 
follow. 
   Suppose that he positions: 'of a supplier A and another- supplier B are, given .by (xa, y, a, Z -
and (xb, yb, .zb). -If the former--is' greater thanx the latter in the sense of, ordering of vectors, . then 
we call that A has achieved a higher degree of evolution than B. Or alternatively, we~ say -that 
the -product of A bears a higher degree of importance than that' of -B... 
   Obviously, it=is,difficult.to treat he degree of importance: as a continuous variable in the 
empirical work. ' We therefore trichotomize the whole space- into the high, middle, and low 
grade. regions. - Correspondingly, we introduce. three dummy, .-variables:IMP1, ' IMP2,. and 
IMP3. If a supplier -and its main-product falls-.under the-, high (middle; low) grade region, we 
assign.-1:: as the value. of IMPV(IMP2, JMP3) and: 0::as : the value of Qther two' dummy 
variables. Since IMPI ° + IMP2 + IMPS. - ' 1 for each supplier; :the., following' two, lternatives 
are, available in carrying out regressions.. One.is.to explicitly deal with.only two. of. the tthree ;-
dummy variables' and,, at the 'same' time; to - include . =the constant erm in the -estimation: 
equation; : the` other ' is: to? explicitly deal with, aft: of the three, dummy variables. and drop the .
constant term.' -Our- choice is to take the. former course and to estimate how- °IMP IMP.-<and. IMP2 .
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give respectively an additional effect in comparison tothe state, which is- taken as a floor, that 
would be. achieved if the supplier belonged to- the IMPS category. 
   How we classified several parts and suppliers into different grade regions is illustrated 
by FIGURE 1. 
                       <FIGURE 1 about here> 
Proxies for. Risk Aversion 
  As the first proxy for the inverse of the degree of risk aversion, x2 in Equation (8), 
Kawasaki and McMillan used "the size of overall operation. f the subcontractor represented 
by the :total sales of the firm." We share their easoning that he size of the firm must be 
inversely related to the degree . of risk aversion, but prefer, "the number of employees of the 
firm," denoted- byNUM, hereafter, to the "total sales of the firm" as the size variable. The 
reason is as follows. From the assumption f the theoretical model,. the degree of risk 
aversion X should be a constant, independent from the profit n which is a stochastic variable. 
However, since the quantity ; ordered from .the subcontractor is normalized toone in this 
model,. as has been noted in.,Section 2, the sales is equal, to the price paid p and hence 
satisfies the following equation. 
                       sales =p=fit+c+h ) 
                       _ {a/(1 - a) lit + b + {a/(1 - a)}h( ). (9) 
Thus the sales is linearly related to the profit. If we take the sales as the proxy for UK, 
therefore, it contradicts the initial assumption. The number of employees.-is, _ on the other 
hand, :directly , related to the, quantity produced; which is assumed to be nonstochastic. 
Therefore it seems more compatible with the theoretical model to use the number of. 
employees a the size variable. In addition, observers on employment practice of Japanese 
firms have reported that adjustment of the number,of employees is made relatively more 
slowly than fluctuation ofsales and profit. 13) 
   As the second proxy for the inverse of the degree of risk aversion, x3 in Equation (8), 
Kawasaki, .and McMillan used !'the proportion of,, materials, secured. by A he subcontractor, 
himself. However, -once, we hypothesize (A2). and                                  (A3), we come :across the following 
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problem. Suppose that two suppliers X and Y have an identical number of customers but are 
in different situations in the following sense. X has already become a satellite to a large and 
growing firm and, further, has been securing this firm as its main customer interms of the 
share in the total sales of X. Starting from this foothold, it has recently acquired additional 
customers. On the other hand, Y has never become a satellite to any firm that can offer a 
large and growing market, so that Y has been compelled to diversify its customers from an 
early stage of development. Then, (A2) and (A3) imply: the main customer of X will 
endeavor to absorb risks involved in its transaction with X to a greater extent han any 
customer of Y will do in its transaction with Y. For this reason, we use a different variable 
as the second proxy for risk aversion. 
   The new variable, denoted by SPEC, represents he degree of concentration of the 
business of the supplier in question to a specific ore firm. To determine the value of SPEC 
for each supplier, we use the reports by IRC as the data source. If the share occupied by a 
specific core firm, say Nissan, in the total sales of a particular supplier, say Aichi Kikai, is 
found to be equal to or more than 33 percent, we assign 1 as the value of SPEC of this 
supplier in its relation to that core firm. If the ratio is below 33 percent, we assign 0. Thus 
we treat SPEC as a dummy variable.14) We predict hat the coefficient of SPEC will take a 
strictly negative value. Thus, SPEC is introduced irectly based on (1) of (A3) stated in 
Section 1. The threshhold value of 33 percent used in determination f the value of SPEC 
is based on a piece of information acquired in the process of field research. 
                   5. The Results and Interpretations
 The Sharing Parameter 
  As has been noted by Kawasaki and McMillan, Equation (5) in Section 2. can be 
rearranged into
a = 1 -S/G, (10)
where s and a represent the standard deviations of profit and cost. We start our estimations 
from computing the value of the sharing parameter a using Equation -(10); -for each of the 
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suppliers that comprise our sample. 
   For profit, we used the value of ~ eigyo rieki- (operating income) in the profit and loss 
statement available from the Cosmos 1Data File. For cost, we used the value of uriage 
genka (cost of sales) available from the same source. By construction f our data set, values 
of these items are available for 11 consecutive fiscal years backward from the fiscal year of 
1987. From these values, we first computed s and a, and then a. 
   To show the values of a for all of the supplier in the, sample would consume too much 
space. We therefore show in TABLE 2, as the summarized result, only the mean and 
variance taken over all of the satellites toeach of the four core firms. 
                      < TABLE 2 about here > 
Testing of Risk Aversion 
   Before we proceed to testing the principal-agent model, we estimate he degree of risk 
aversion, ?,, as Kawasaki and McMillan did in Section 5 of their article. Estimation of? can 
be done in two different ways. The first is to apply the same method that Kawasaki and 
McMillan used in reaching the results hown in their TABLE 2. The method consists of two 
steps. The first step is to derive the following equation, using the assumptions of constant 
risk aversion and normality of cost and profit disturbances, from the expression for the 
subcontractor's expected utility of profit: 
                   µ=(A/2)s2+ (11) 
where µ is the mean of profit and k corresponds tothe profit after isk premium. The second 
step is to estimate ?,/2 and k for each group of satellites orrounding a core firm by a 
regression using the values of µ and 12 computed from the time series data on profit from 
Cosmos 1 Data File. The result acquired by this method is shown by our TABLE 3. 
                      <TABLE 3 about here > 
  Anotherr way of estimating X is as follows. Note first that, for Kawasaki and McMillan, 
it was impossible to. go beyond computing just one value of ? for all of the firms subsumed 
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in a class, since only classified aggregate data were available to them. .But, since data on 
individual suppliers are available to us, we can go, beyond computing Just one value of ) for 
all of the satellites urrounding a core firm, :which we have done, right now by the first 
method. As the-initial, step, let us note the following two points. First, on the purely 
theoretical ground, X should most plausibly decrease as the size- of the firm increases.- Second, 
TABLE II by Kawasaki and McMillan clearly shows that he result of their empirical testing, 
indeed supports this theoretical : reasoning. Taking note of these., two points, let us presume 
a function, a. = X (z),. where z represents he size of the firm.- Within. the family of functions 
which have the property that the value of the. function k decreases as z, increases, we choose, 
the following two functions and try to estimate the parameters of the functions. 
         (Case 1) = coexp(-ciz) (12) 
          (Case 2) k-= _do + d1/z (13) 
Inserting (12) or. (13) into (11) we eliminated k .. Then, using. the data. on 6µ and s2,, and the 
number of employees. as the value :of z, we :estimated (co,c1,k) .or. (do,d1,k) by the maximumm 
likelihood method.: The acquired results are shown in: TABLE -4 and TABLES respectively: . 
Note that the estimates oUco, cl, do, .and 1 take positive values .for, all. of .the -s..atellite groups. 
This corroborates our prediction that all of the sattelites . ,are risk' averse- and their degree. of 
absolute risk aversion decreases as the size of the firm increases, which also reinforces one 
of :the main results acquired by Kawasaki and McMillan.
                          <-:TABLE 4 about here:: > ; 
                          <: TABLE` 5.a                                bout here > 
Test of the Principal Agent Model 
  To test the principal-agent model: given by Equation (7), we used, just as Kawasaki and 
McMillan did, two kinds of estimation equations both of which are derived from Equation (7). 
The first one corresponds-4o .their Model 1.: As. has been explained =in Section . 4; ~wc<replaced 
their"":two- proxies :.fbr_ risk aversion by_NUM, and SY,EC,, Further,, vie -introdueOd d IMPI, ;and_.!
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IMP2 in place of their two proxies for moral hazard. Thus our first estimation equation is: 
         ln(l/ct - 1) = ao + alln(1/c2) + a2NUM + a3SPEC + a4IMP1 + a5IMP2 + E, (14) 
where a3 is predicted to take a negative value,. while a1, a2, a4, and a5 are predicted to be 
positive, and a4 is predicted to be larger than a5. 
   Our second estimation equation, which corresponds to Model 2 of Kawasaki and 
McMillan, is: 
        ln(1/a - 1) = bo + blln(1/a2) + b2ln(1/k) + b4IMP1 + _b5IMP2 + E, (15) 
where b1, b2, b4, and b5 are predicted to be positive, and b4 is predicted to take a larger value 
than b5. 
   Using the results given in the previous ubsection, we estimated the coefficients -of (15) 
by two methods. In the first method, we assumed that X can be expressed as an exponential 
function of the .size of the firm, z, as is in (12); then, using the values of parameters of the 
function, co. and c1, given. in. TABLE 4, and the values of z given by Cosmos 1 Data File, 
we computed ? for each of `  the suppliers. Using the values of X thus acquired, the 
coefficients were :estimated. In the second method, we adopted hyperbolic function as the 
functional form of X = X (z), as is in (13); then, using the values. of ; do and d1 given in 
TABLE 5 and those of z, ;we computed, the values. of ? , using which the coefficients were 
estimated. . 
  The results of the estimation of Equation (14) are shown in TABLE 6. The estimates of. 
the: -coefficients of Equation (15) acquired by the first method explained above are shown in, 
TABLE 7 under the. name of (15a), those acquired by the second method being given. in 
TABLE 8 under -the name of (15b). For all of the estimations -of the coefficients of these' 
equations, OLS was used. 
                       < TABLE 6 about here > . 
                      <TABLE 7;, about here> 
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<TABLE 8 about here>
Interpretation of the results 
   In the first place, the results acquired for a shown in TABLE 2 are striking. From the 
very definition of a given by Equation (10) and the mothod we adopted for estimation, what 
TABLE 2 is exactly telling us is as follows. Take any of the four groups of satellites that 
surround the four major Japanese automobile manufacturers re pectively. Then, the suppliers 
in the group have shown, on average, the following sort of financial performance: in
comparison to the fluctuation of cost of sales that the average supplier experienced over the 
past eleven fiscal years, the fluctuation of operating income that the same supplier had over 
the same - period was only 10 percent in magnitude. What factors have worked as shock 
absorbers ? We cannot entirely deny the possibility that some accounting practices or 
financial operations meant for leveling the reported income figures over time may have 
exerted influence. But, since we are working on operating income here, not dealing with 
ordinary income nor net income, it is not very likely that such practices or operations could 
become the dominant factor. Thus we can regard that the phenomenon we observe here as 
being caused by, for the most part, the nature of business transactions which these suppliers 
have been engaged in. Here again, we cannot entirely deny the possibility that the 
transactions with firms other than the specific core firm in question may have exerted 
influence. That such effect should be taken into account must be especially true for those 
suppliers for which the SPEC variable takes the value of zero. Yet, the most natural way to 
interprete the results in TABLE 2 seems to be to presume that the core firms have 
significantly absorbed external shocks incurred by their suppliers, mainly through ex post 
price adjustments conducted at each period in a manner that can be approximated by the 
model we are using. As will be discussed shortly, the SPEC variable is shown to affect the 
value of a in the positive direction as has been predicted. This reinforces the interpretation 
of TABLE 2 we have just given. 
  Comparison of our TABLE 2 with TABLE I in Kawasaki and McMillan (1987) reveals 
one interesting point. The values we acquired for a are, on the whole, much larger than those 
estimated by Kawasaki and McMillan, except that heir estimate for one class of firms which 
belong to the transportation equipment industry and have 50 to 99 employees comes very 
close to our estimates. This difference between our estimates and theirs seems to reflect he
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following observed phenomenon which has been subsumed by (Al) and (A2) in Section 1.-
The phenomenon 'is that, among the transactions that core firms have with all of their 
suppliers, only in those which they have with their "satellites," core firms seriously think 
about absorbing risks based on long-term considerations. 
   A caveat becomes necessary inmaking inferences from the results hown in TABLES 3, 
6, 7, and 8. Since we are making cross-sectional nalyses of firms here, homoscedasticity 
of the error terms is unlikely to hold, meaning that t-statistics from OLS will not be 
consistent. 15) We therefore computed White-adjusted t-statistics, the values of which are 
shown in the parentheses under the estimates in these TABLEs. It has turned out that, 
notwithstanding this adjustment, a considerable number of the estimates remain significant; 
at some places, White-adjusted t-statistics takes even more favorable values in comparison 
to the values taken by ordinary t-statistics that are shown in the corresponding TABLEs in 
Asanuma nd Kikutani (1990). 
   Let us look at the test of the principal-agent model, starting from TABLE 6. As to the 
effect. of the degree of cost fluctuations, the coefficient takes positive values for all of the 
satellite groups as has been predicted, and the estimates are significant all over. This 
reinforces one of the main results reported by Kawasaki and McMillan. Concerning the effect 
of the firm size measured by the number of employees, the coefficient takes uniformly 
positive values here again as has been predicted. The estimates are not only significant, but 
also taking larger values for the satellites of Toyota and those of MMC than other satellite 
groups. This parallels a result seen in TABLEs 4 and 5 that for the satellites of Toyota and 
those of MMC the degree of risk aversion decreases with the increase of the size of the 
supplier more sharply in comparison to other satellite groups. 
   Regarding the effect of SPEC, the coefficient akes negative values and the estimates are 
significant all over, which supports our prediction. In comparison with the result of the test 
of a similar hypothesis exercised by Kawasaki and McMillan using the number of parent 
firms as the proxy, our SPEC has brought a more satisfactory result. A second caveat should 
be mentioned in this connection, however. We cannot deny the possibility that SPEC may 
represent aspects of both risk aversion and moral hazard. If SPEC is large because the 
supplier has been supplying a number of different items in parallel to the core firm in 
question, then the core firm may be able to assume that the moral hazard associated with a 
particular contract for a particular item is relatively small, for, the supplier knows that poor 
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performance on this contract can be punished, by the., core firm's, refusing to renew its. other 
contracts. Thus SPEC's being large could mean that the supplier is very risk averse and that 
moral. hazard is small. Both effects work in the same direction in. the regression equation, 
which might explain the fact that the estimation results how the SPEC coefficient o be 
significant. 16> 
  -Concerning the effect of the degree of evolution,.the coefficient of IMP11 is larger than 
that of IMP2 and both are positive for-all of the satellite groups. , Again, .this is consonant 
with our prediction. Although only half of the estimates. are significant, he result has been 
improved in comparison to.the stimated coefficient acquired by Kawasaki and McMillan for 
the .wage/material cost variable. One. might guess, however, that the degree.. of evolution 
achieved by the supplier would tend to be related to the- size :of the firm. If this- is in fact 
true, then the multicollinearity problem arises. To investigate the extent of correlation 
between the degree of evolution variable and the size variable, -we classified all of the 
satellites .to each of the four automobile manufacturers . into the following, six classes -and 
computed,-the average number of employees for the firms in each of the,.. classes: (SPEC, 
IMPI), (SPEC,' IMP2),: (SPEC, IMP3), (NONSPEC, .IMP1), (NONSPEC, IMP2), and. 
(NONSPEC, IMP3). ' For the suppliers in the NONSPEC category, the following is indeed 
true for -all of the four core firm groups: as : we proceed from IMPS suppliers to IMP2 
suppliers and.Ahen --to IMP1, suppliers, the -average number of suppliers. increases tepwise. 
On the other hand, however:, 'for-the suppliers in the,._SPEC category, the same ^does not hold 
all over. For Mazda, and Mitsubishi, IMP2 suppliers have, on average, a greater number, of 
employees than. IMP1 suppliers. But;: we should admit.that-this re ult may inn turn have been 
subject to sampling bias. This is because;: aswe-have mentioned: before, .necessary data were 
not available for all ~of firms in each of the -satellite -groups, and hence, when, we divide our 
sample satellites, into six classes, the -number, of firms. in a-class sometimes. becomes every 
small. We therefore cannot dismiss- the `correlation issue-as the result of, this investigation:.of--
our .m sample. However, at the level, of theoretical conception with.. a_, limited number.t of
concrete xamples, we do, not,'think that-the.- degree ..of evolution must. proceed" with- the size 
of firm hand =in hand. For instance,, & supplier named Usui: Kokusai'Sangyo, . Inc, : has expertise 
in producing fine. tubes including fuel and brake- tubes-,andshould be classified into IMPI. 
It nevertheless has kept to be ',a moderate ;sized, firm, which had only .720 employees: asof, 
1986.. On the other. hand, we have classified severallarge- chemicait f rms~ auto. IMPS, as Tong.
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as they are supplying not so high value added items as just one component of their much 
diversified product portfolio. In sum, the result we acquired for the degree of evolution 
variable cannot be taken as final and decisive, which is our third caveat. We nevertheless 
believe that the result is providing a useful foothold for further progress. 
   Let us turn to TABLE 7 and TABLE 8. These are meant to provide apair of results both 
of which correspond to the result shown by Kawasaki and McMillan in their TABLE III for 
their Model II. As has been mentioned before, to get estimates shown in TABLE 7(8), we 
used the values of X acquired utilizing the results hown in TABLE. 4(5). Since nonlinear 
estimations were done to get the results hown in TABLEs 4 and 5, inferences on significance 
of the estimated coefficients based on t-statistics hould be made with caution. Bearing this 
caveat in mind, we see in TABLEs 7 and 8, most of the coefficients have the predicted signs 
and are significant. The results hown in TABLEs 7 and 8 are, on the whole, comparable to
those shown in TABLE 6. In comparing the two, TABLE 8 gives somewhat better esults 
than TABLE 7 on the whole, except hat in TABLE 8 the coefficient of IMP2 takes a 
negative but insignificant value for the satellites of Toyota.
6. Concluding Remarks
   In this paper we presented the results of our attempt to proceed one step further in the 
analysis of Japanese manufacturer-supplier relationships u ing a seminal accomplishment by 
Kawasaki and McMillan as an important foothold. Though a number of caveats mentioned 
in Section 5 should be borne in mind in interpreting the results of our estimation, the results 
presented in this paper provide interesting evidence on the nature of relations between 
Japanese major core firms and their suppliers. Not only it reinforces the three major findings 
reported by Kawasaki and McMillan, it illuminates a couple of important aspects anew by 
virtue of the newly constructed data set. For one thing, the values of sharing parameter a e 
found to be higher than those reported by Kawasaki and McMillan, when we focus on the 
relations between major core firms and their "satellite" type suppliers. For another, the 
attitudes taken by the four major core firms toward their respective satellites on risk 
absorption are found to be surprisingly similar; the empirical laws summarized as (1) and (2) 
of (A3) in Section 1 that Asanuma has elicited through his field research seem to be 
supportable in light of the quantitative data that we have mobilized in this research.
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   Concerning RSH, there seems to be little room that this can survive rigorous testing. As 
Asanuma recognized in-(A1), there do exist some suppliers that are used by some core firm 
as capacity buffer. But, to explain such use of some firm, the economic theory of risk 
bearing is neither suited nor necessary. As Kawasaki and McMillan (1987) asserted in the 
second paragraph ofp. 345, it can be explained simply by downward (upward) movement of 
opportunity cost of internal production perceived by core firms in business downswings 
(upswings). 
  The empirical laws summarized as (1) and (2) of (A3) may seem paradoxical to those 
who have been accustomed to RSH, but are not difficult to explain if we put things in an 
evolutionary perspective as follows. As Tasugi (1961) rightly perceived thirty years ago, the 
primary motive for a major core firm to employ the firms in the nucleus part of its suppliers 
is not to make a buffer against business fluctuations, but to tap specialized abilities 
accumulated by these firms making it thereby possible to use its own human resources in .a 
more concentrated way. But, to secure sufficient adaptability ofthe production etwork thus 
spanned, these suppliers are required to develop a certain kind of skill named "relation-
specific skill" by Asanuma (1989). Development of this skill, in turn, requires continuity of 
the relation. Further, the core firm has to care about the health of each supplier, as far as it 
has cleared initial screening for admission to the nucleus group and continues to pass 
experience ratings, to promote development of this skill. The more underdeveloped the 
supplier, the more concerned the core firm has to be about the health of this supplier; as the 
supplier grows up, the core firm can gradually decrease its attention. 
   Several problems remain to be further illuminated. First, in the theoretical model used 
in this paper, the quantity ordered from the subcontractor for each period is normalized to 
one. Hence the effect of quantity fluctuation experienced over time cannot be analyzed. 
Though it seems difficult to obtain relevant data for this type of analysis, the task of 
developing a suitable theoretical model nonetheless remains. Second, extending the type of 
analysis that we have done in this paper toward the manufacturer-dealer interface seems to 
be a very interesting task. Such work is expected to contribute to illuminate more fully 
aspects of the risk sharing mechanism developed in the Japanese society.
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                             Footnotes 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented atthe first SITE Summer Workshop on 
July 10, 1990 at Stanford University. A still earlier version was presented at an annual 
meeting of the Japan association ofEconomics and Econometrics held at Tsukuba University 
on October 14-15,1989. . We thank Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, Masahiko Aoki, Hideshi 
Itoh, Konosuke Odaka, Keiko Okazaki, John McMillan, and an annonymous referee of this 
Journal for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Masahito Kobayashi for 
suggestions on statistical techniques and Yuji Yumoto for computational assistance. Financial 
support from the Japanese Ministry of Education (under Grant 63215001) is greatfully 
acknowledged. Part of the research was conducted receiving financial support from the Center 
for Economic Policy Research of Stanford University. The computational work was done 
using the facilities of the Kyoto University Data Processing Center. 
1. The term subcontracting has been -used in several meanings both*in practice.and in the 
literature. In its broadest meaning, it is used as synonymous with purchasing of any sort of 
the part or processing service necessary tomanufacture a final product. This coincides with 
the use of the term in the first paragraph of the text. In another usage, purchasing of 
noncustomized parts or processing services is excluded from the meaning of the term. In a 
still narrower usage, only purchasing of DS parts in Asanuma's terminology is contained in 
the meaning of the term. In the main body of this paper, the term is used in its second 
meaning for the reason that will be given in the text. 
2. Yuka Shoken Hokokusho Soran of each Japanese automobile manufacturer contains abrief 
description of the outside purchasing of the company. The term outside purchasing ratio is 
defined in this source as the proportion of the payment to outside firms for the parts and 
processing services purchased therefrom in the total manufacturing costs incurred by the 
automobile manufacturer to build one unit of vehicle. The ratio typically ranges from 70 to 
75 percent. By comparing this information with TABLE 1 in Page 30 of Cole and Yakushiji 
(1984), it can be inferred that GM and Ford have been buying less portion from outside in 
comparison to any Japanese automobile manufacturers. Further, in MITI (1984), the result 
of a field research as-been reported to illuminate that, in TV set production, typical Japanese 
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firms have 
counterpart.
tended to buy more portion from. outside in comparison to their American
3. MITI(1984) has manifested the view that the social division of -labor achieved by 
subcontracting has significantly . contributed to the postwar development of Japanese, 
manufacturing industryand the importance ofthe role played by subcontractors is foreseen to 
grow, rather than decline, as products of -the high value-added types come to occupy greater 
portions of national products. Both Altshuler et.al.(1984) and Cole and Yakushiji (1984) have 
noted that one of the competitive edges hared by major Japanese automobile manufacturers 
vis-a-vis their foreign competitors must reside in manufacturer-supplier relationships and that 
that a currently discernible trend. in the U.S. and Western Europe is a movement toward more 
vertical disintegration with closer: manufacturer-supplier interface. More.. recently, The MIT 
Commission on Industrial Productivity (1989) -has. tressed that he component supply system 
developed in Japan contains elements worth emulation by American automobile 
manufacturers. In a more general context, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) have clarified that 
an integral aspect of. modem manufacturing is to increase reliance on outside suppliers which, 
although keep independence in terms of ownership, are linked with the firm on the purchasing 
side by closer communication than in the traditional arms-length exchange relations.
4. For a description of the typical characterization of Japanese subcontracting system in the 
context of the "dual structure," see Chapter 5of Nakamura (1981), especially p.175. Chapter 
4 of Friedman (1988) contains a useful historical overview of the "dual structure" view, as 
well as the result of his empirical study that has led him to the conclusion that, in actuality, 
applicability of the characterization of the Japanese Economy put forth by the "dual structure" 
view is limited to the period from the late 1930s to the late 1960s. Nakamura himself seems 
to hold the view that the "dual structure" began to emerge in the 1920s, was a-real problem 
in the 1950s, and then became insignificant during the 1960s. But, the momentum of the "dual 
structure" view remained quite strong long after the beginning of the 1970s. See also footnote 
6 for a related point.
5. In a pioneering study of subcontracting relationships.. in= the Japanese machinery industry, 
the same author had already noted that there was a possibile-line- of development toward such
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a direction. See Tasugi (1941), especially pp.253-254. 
6. See Sato (1989) for a historical survey of the research on the Japanese small and medium 
sized firms. 
7. See also Aoki (1984b) for further emarks on this point. For his more recent remarks on 
manufacturer-supplier relationships in Japan, see Aoki (1988, 1990). 
8. For the terminology of the "Ordered Goods," "Marketed Goods," and so on, see 
Asanuma (1989). 
9. Our definition of the term "satellite" allows that s supplier can be a satellite of more than 
one core firms simulataneously. In fact, a number of such cases can be found. In other 
words, the groups of satellites urrounding major core firms are not disjoint. 
10. For this exposition of the incentive ffect, see Aoki (1988), p.213. 
11. According to a press release made by Nissan in April 1991, reorganization of the two 
cooperative associations of parts suppliers to Nissan will take place in June 1991. Takarakai 
and Shohokai will be dissoluted to form a single association named Nisshokai. The principal 
motive is to respond to criticism of the closed nature of the traditional form of the two 
organizations. As far as Takarakai and Shohokai stood separately based on different principles 
for membership as is described in the text, it was inevitable for Nissan to face such criticism . 
12. The reader may want to know here why the group of the "satellites" to Honda has been 
removed from the object of our analysis. The reason is that Honda's purchasing behavior has 
been somewhat nomalous incomparison toother Japanese automobile manufacturer, making 
it difficult to apply the same method that we use in this paper. The anomaly occurs in the 
following two respects. First, Honda has never had any cooperative association corresponding 
to its corporate headquarters level, while each of Honda's plants located in different places 
in Japan has had cooperative associations comprised by local and small sized suppliers. This 
makes it impossible to delineate the entire body of the satellites to Honda using the member 
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list of cooperative association as we did for other core firms. Second, from 1978 on, each 
annual edition of Nippon no Jidosha Buhin Kogyo does provide a name list of "main suppliers 
to Honda" as an appendix to the portion where member lists of the cooperative associations 
to other automobile manufacturers are given. However, as TABLE 1 shows, the composition 
of the "main suppliers to Honda" is significantly more fluid than that of the cooperative 
associations of other automobile manufacturers. Thus, it is questionable whether the list of 
"main suppliers of Honda" can be taken as equivalent to the list of the satellites to Honda. 
Further esearch is required to determine (a) how and to what extent Honda has made effort 
to build up its own satellites and (b) the names of the satellites, before extending our analysis 
to cover Honda.
13. See, for instance, Chapter 7 of Muramatsu (1983).
14. Obviously it would be nicer if we could treat SPEC as a continuous variable. Due to lack 
of sufficient data, however, such treatment is impossible.
15. We thank an annonymous referee for pointing out this problem and suggesting the use 
of White-adjusted-t statistics which are consistent under heteroscedasticity.
16. We owe this point to John McMillan.
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           TABLE 1 
Stability of membership of satellites by core firm
Name of the core firm





of yearly exit 
(1978-1987) 
Average number 

















 Mazda's averages are taken over the period of 1981-1987 
 since data on Yokokai, its recently organized nationwide 
 cooperative organization of suppliers, is available only 
 from 1981.
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            TABLE 2 
The mean and variance of a of satellites by core firm
Name of the core firm
Toyota Nissan Mazda MMC
Number of 
satellites 
in the sample 


















    TABLE 3 
of risk aversion (unit of k: 105 yen)
Name of the core firm
Estimated 
coefficient Toyota Nissan Mazda MMC
























gnificant at the 1 percent level.
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           TABLE 4 
 Estimates ofrisk aversion (unit. of k: 105 yen) 
[The case of exponential function: equation (12)]
Name of the core firm
Estimated 
coefficient Toyota Nissan Mazda MMC
































Significant at the 5 percent level.
i
32
          TABLE 5 
Estimates of risk aversion (unit of k: 105 yen) 
[The case of hyperbolic function: equation (13)]
Name of the core firm
Estimated 
coefficient Toyota Nissan Mazda MMC

































gnificant at the 5 percent level.
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       TABLE 6 
Test of the Principal-Agent 
      [Equation (14)]
Model
Name of the core firm
Independent 
variable Toyota Nissan Mazda MMC
ao 
log(1/62) 





























































at the 5 percent level. 
at the 1 percent level.
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           TABLE 7 
     Test of the Principal-Agent Model 
[The case of exponential function: equation (15a)]
Independent 
variable
Name of the core firm





















































at the 5 percent level. 
at the 1 percent level.
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           TABLE 8 
    Table of the Principal-Agent Model 
[The case of hyperbolic function: equation (15b)]
Name of the core firm
Independent 



















































 Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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